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Abstract
Logic programming languages based on fragments of
intuitionistic logic have recently been developed and
studied by several researchers. I n such languages, intplications are permitted i n goals and i n the bodies of
clauses. Attempting to prove a goal of the form D > G
i n a context I' leads t o an attempt to prove the goal G
i n the extended context I' U { D ) . While an intuitionistic notion of context has many uses, it has turn.ed
out t o be either too powerful or too limiting i n several
settings. W e refine the intuitionistic notion of context
by using a fragment of Girard's linear logic that includes additive and multiplicative con3unction, linear
implication, universal quantification, the "of course"
exponential, and the constants 1 (the empty context)
and T (for "erasing" contexts). After presenting our
fragment of linear logic, we show that the logic h,as
a goal-directed interpretation. W e also show that the
non-determinism that results from the need to split
contexts in order t o prove a multiplicative con~unctioiz
can be handled by viewing proof search as a process
that takes a context, consumes part of it, and returns
the rest (to be consumed elsewhere). Examples taken
from theorem proving, natural language parsing, and
data base programming are presented: each example
requires a linear, rather than intuitionistic, notion of
context t o be modeled adequately.

'This paper appears in LICS91. A typographical error
in Figure 5 has been fixed. Both authors have been funded
by ONR N0001488-K-0633, NSF CCR-87-05596, and DARPA
N00014-85-K-0018 through the University of Pennsylvania from
which Miller is on a one year leave. Miller has also been supported by SERC Grant No. GR/E 78487 "The Logical Framework,, and ESPRIT Basic Research Action No. 3245 "Logical
Frameworks: Design Implementation and Experiment."
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Iiltroduction

Fragments of intuitionistic first-order and higher-order
logics have been used for several years as specification
languages and logic programming languages. For example, first-order and higher-order versions of hereditary Harrop formulas (formulas with no positive occurrences of disjunctions or existentials) have been
used as both specification languages for proof systems
[7,8,25,29] and as the basis of logic programming languages [9, 12, 18, 20, 211. Much of the expressivity of
such systems derives from the the intuitionistic proof
rule which states that t o prove an implicational goal
of the form D > G in the presence of a proof context
I', the context is augmented with D and a proof of G
is attempted in the new context. T h a t is, the sequent
I'-D~GhasaproofifandonlyifI'U{D)-G
has a proof.
The presence of changing antecedents (contexts)
within intuitionistic sequent proofs can be exploited
in many ways. In theorem provers, it can be used to
store the current assumptions and eigen-variables of a
proof; in natural language parsers, it can be used t o
store assumed gaps when parsing relative clauses; in
database programs, it can be used t o store the state
of the data base; in logic programs, it can be used t o
provide a basis for modular programming, local declarations, and abstract data types.
While intuitionistic contexts naturally address computing concerns in a large number of applications, in
other applications they are too limiting. speaking
opera.tionally, one problem that appears frequently is
that once an item is placed into a context, it is not
possible to remove it, short of stopping the process
that created the context. In a logical sense, a formula
in a context is available t o be used any number of

times. Thus, the freely available contraction rule for
intuitionistic contexts means that contexts can always
be assumed t o grow as the proof is developed from
the bottom up. Such monotonicity is problematic in
numerous settings.
When using an intuitionistic meta-logic to design
theorem provers it is natural t o use the metalogic's context t o manage object-level hypotheses and eigen-variables [8, 141. With such an approach, however, it is not possible to specify any
variations to the contraction rule: arbitrary contraction on all hypotheses is imposed by the mnetalogic.

the usual one [I, 101 in some simple ways. First, the
antecedent (left-hand side) of a sequent arrow will always contain a single formula: the comma traditionally used in the antecedent of a sequent will be formally identified with the connective @, and an empty
antecedent with the formula 1. Thus no introduction
rule for @ on the left is needed. Second, antecedents
(contexts) are identified if they can be shown t o be
equal via the equations for associativity, commutativity, identity, and the idempotency of !'ed formulas.
That is, two contexts are considered equal for the purposes of building sequent proofs if one arises from the
other by applying the following equations to subformulas that are either top-level or in the scope of @'s
only:

A proposed technique for parsing relative clauses
is t o first assume the existence of a noun phrase
( a gap) and then attempt t o parse a senteilce [24].
Intuitionistic contexts do not naturally enforce
the constraint that the assumed gap must be used
while parsing the relative clause and that the gap
cannot appear in certain positions ("island constraints" 1271).
Intuitionistic contexts can be used to manage a
data base. While adding facts, querying facts,
and performing hypothetical reasoning ("if I pass
CS121 will I graduate") are easy to model using intuitionistic contexts, updating and retracting facts are not straightforward [3, 9, 191.

A notion of state encapsulation can be approximated using intuitionistic logic [15]. An object's
state can be represented by assumptions in a context. Updating that state, however, means chailging those assumptions. The only change allowed
with intuitionistic contexts is that of augmenting the state's representative assumptions. Thus,
an object's state becomes progressively more nondeterministic: seldom the correct notion of state.
Each of these problems can, however, be addressed by
adopting a more refined notion of context. In this estended abstract, we exa.mine a fragment of linear logic
that makes a suitable logic programming language and
permits very natural forinulatioils that a.ddress a.ll of
the above problems.

2

Language Design Issues

Consider a first-order logic based on the logical constants @ (tensor), & (additive conjunction), -0 (linear
implication), ! (of-course), V, 1, T. Our presentation
of sequent proof systems for this logic will differ from

By employing this notion of equality on contexts, the
structural rules of interchange, contraction for !'ed formulas, and thinning for the formula 1 (the empty contest) are used implicitly. If s is a subformula o f t that
occurs in t in the scope of only 8 ' s and is neither a
top-level @I nor equal to 1, then s is a c o m p o n e n t o f t .
If the outermost connective in t is not a @, then t has
only one component.

A cut-free, sequent style proof system C for this fragment of linear logic is given in Figure 1. The syntactic
variables r, B , C denote formulas. The syntactic variable ! r denotes a thinable formula, that is, a formula
all of whose components are either 1 or !B (for some
B). The standard eigen-variable condition is assumed
for the VR rule. A proof rule that says that if r and
I" are equal contexts and if r
C has a proof then
I?'
C has a, proof is assumed t o be used whenever
it is needed.

-

-

P r o p o s i t i o n 1 Let B be a first-order f o r m u l a o v e r
the logical constants @, &, 4,!,V, 1, T. T h e sequent
1
B is provable i n C i f a n d o n l y if B i s provable i n
linear logic. For t h i s sublogic, provability i n classical
and i a f u i f i o n i s t i c linear logic coincide [30].

-

-

Two formulas B and C are equivalent, written B
C,
if the sequents B + C and C
B are provable in
C. We note the following equivalences:
1 E!T, !(B & C ) =!B@!C,
B-o(C&D)_(B-oC)&(B-oD),
B 4 (Vx.C) G Vx(B -0 C ) (provided x not free in B )
Vx(B & C) (V2.B) & (Vx.C)

=

!r@B-B

identity

-

1R -T R
!r
1
r-T

proof: a cut-free, sequent proof is uniform if whenever a sequent in the proof has a non-atomic succedent (right-hand side), that sequent is the conclusion
of a right introduction rule. A logical system is an
(abstract) logac p r o g r a m m i n g l a n g u a g e if restricting to
uniform proofs preserves completeness. Thus, if a seB is provable in a logic programming
quent
language, it is always possible to find a proof by first
concentrating only on the succedent of the sequent,
breaking down its logical structure and reflecting it
into the proof. Left introduction rules only need to be
considered when atomic succedents are encountered.

-

r-B
A-C
r@A-B@C

@R

Figure 1: C: A Proof System for a Fragment of Li11ea.r
Logic
Given the first equivalence, the constant 1 could be
eliminated from our consideration, although there
seems to be no good reason to do so.
It is possible to strengthen C proofs a bit further, by
observing that the multiplicative inference rules, - o L
and @ R , can be assumed to behave additavely with respect of !'ed formulas. That is, we can assume that, for
both of these inference rules, if the antecedent of the
conclusion has the component !B, then !B is a component of the antecedent of both premises. A proof
where this additional restriction on 4 L and @ R holds
will be called a !-additive proof. Thus, a !-additive
proof of the sequent !B @ r
C is such that the antecedent of all sequents in the proof contain a top-level
occurrence of !B.

-

P r o p o s i t i o ~ i2 T h e seq,uenl 1
B h a s a !-addiliae
i f a n d o n l y i f B i s provable Z I I l i n e a r logic.

L proof

The logic considered so far does not yield a satisfactory logic programming language because it cannot
be interpreted in a completely goal-directed fashion.
Following [19, 211, we formalize the notion of goaldirected provability by the simple notion of a u n i f o n ~ z

Restricting provability in C to uniform proofs does not
maintain completeness, however. For example, the seq u e n t ~!a & b -!a
and b @ (b-o!a) -!a
are provable
in L but do not have uniform proofs. Given this observation there seem to be two approaches to take: restrict the language so that a !'ed formula, for example,
never appears in a succedent, or restrict formulas that
occur in contexts so that the above counterexamples
(and their kin) do not appear. The first approach has
been taken in the recent paper [13]. We shall take the
second approach, however, for three reasons. First,
some of the examples mentioned in Section 1 are most
successfully explained using ! in succedents. Second,
it can be seen that if the intuitionistic connectives of
hereditary Harrop formulas are mapped into formulas
using linear connectives [lo], occurrences of ! never
appear immediately under & or as the conclusion of
4 . Maintaining such a restriction rules out the above
two examples sequents and would seem a sensible approach since the logic here is a refinement of hereditary Harrop formulas. Third, it will be useful for an
interpreter to be able to examine a component of its
context and to determine immediately whether it is a
"use once" formula or a "use any number" formula.
If ! were permitted as a strictly positive subformula
occurrence of a & or a -0, it would not be possible
to make this distinction immediately. In the first example, there is a non-deterministic choice to be made
before this distinction can be made with the formula
!a & b , and in the second a subproof needs to be performed (to prove b) before it can be seen that the
formula b - a ! a yields a !'ed formula. Our restrictions
on the logic will be those that exclude these kinds of
forniulas in contexts.
Below is the definition of three classes of formulas: R
for resource formulas, D for definite formulas (program formulas), and G for goal formulas (queries).

-

It is possible t o show that if C proofs are rest,ricted to
proofs of sequents of the form D
G then uniform
proofs are complete. The restricted logic is, therefore,
an abstract logic programming language. This result
can be strengthened by first making the following definitions.
Let R be a closed resource formula. Let IRI be the
smallest set of pairs (G, R'), where G is a multiset of
goal formulas and Rt is a resource formula, such that

2. if (G, R i & Rg) E IR1 then both
(G, R2) E IRI

(6,R1) E IRI and

3. if ((;,Vx.Ri) E JRI then for all closed terms t ,
(G, Rt[tlxl) E IRI
4. if (G,G -o Rt) E (RI then (G U {G), R') E IRI
(here, 6 U {G) is multiset union)

Informally, if (G, A) E (RI then the formula R can
be used to establish the atomic formula A if each of
the goal formulas in G can be established; that is, A
might be proved by backchaining over R. Let C' be the
proof system that results from replacing the identity,
-oL, &L, and VL rules in Figure 1 with the backchaining inference rule in Figure 2. Thus, there are only
two left rules in C', namely, backchaining and !L. The
notion of !-additive proofs is easily extended to L'.
The following proposition helps t o justify our claim
that our restriction to linear formulas yields a logic
programming language.

-

P r o p o s i t i o n 3 Let G be a goal formula. The sequent
1
G h a s a !-additive, u n i f o r m proof i n C' if a ~ t d
o n l y if G i s provable in linear logic.
This proposition can be proved by showing that any
proof in C can be transformed directly into a uniform
proof in Ct by a series of permutations of inference
rules. Similar permutation arguments can be found in
[19, 211.
Since the formulas allowed in antecedents are different
from those allowed in succedents, a cut rule cannot
be stated for this logic programming language. The
collection of formulas in the intersection between Dand G-formulas is, however, non-empty and can be
described using the following two classes of formulas:

Figure 2: Backchaining: provided n
and ({GI,. . . , G,), A) E IRI.

2 0, A is atomic,

The collection of M formulas is precisely those formulas which are both goals and definite formulas. A
cut-elimination theorem can be stated and proved for
a restriction t o M formulas only. Modulo the equivalences 1 4 s S a~n d ( M 1 @ M 2 ) - o S M1-oM2-oS,
~
the ~ollect~ion
S can also be described as simply that
collection of formulas freely generated from &, V, and
both linear and intuitionistic implications: that is, S
can be defined by

It is worth noting some simple variants of the definitions of R, D , and G formulas. First, it is an easy
matter t o add the existential quantifier and the additive disjunction @ to goal formulas: all the results
below generalize easily to this case. (It is not possible
to add existential quantifiers or @ to either resource
formulas or definite formulas without seriously losing
the completeness of uniform proofs.) Second, given
the equivalences mentioned above, it is possible to replace the definition for resources with

Such a simplification makes the presentation of
ba.ckchaining a bit simplier, a fact used in the next
section.

A final comment: If the uniformity conditions are applied directly to proofs in Girard's original formulation
of intuitionistic linear logic [lo] then completeness is
lost quickly, even for the restricted language described
above. For example, the sequents a @ 6
6 @ a and
!a -!a@!a
have proofs but not uniform proofs. In
the first case, an @L rule is required t o convert the
antecedent to a, b and in the second case, a contract,ion is needed to form the antecedent !a,!a (reading
proofs bottom-up). Since these left rules must be done
before any right rule, these sequents do not have uniform proofs. In this setting, however, such a failure is
easy to circumvent: in both cases, the contexts a @ b
and a, b, and !a and !a, !a, do not seem different in any
significant computational sense. Formally identifying

-

them as is done in C and L' produces proof systems in
which uniform proofs cover a greater number of ca.ses.

3

I{l)I

subtensor(1,O)
I{T)O

I{G)I
I{!G) I

An Input/Output Model of Resource Consumption

The information in Proposition 3 is enough to form
the basis of the design of a prototype interpreter for
this restriction of linear logic. Such an interpreter
will not, however, receive any guidance when it needs
t o break up an antecedent in order to apply the @ R
or backchaining rules in a bottom-up fashion. Given
that proofs can b e assumed to be !-additive, a theorem prover only needs t o decide how t o break up the
non-!'ed formulas in the context. Nevertheless, trying
all possible partitions of those formulas is, of course,
exponential in the number of such formulas. Clearly,
a better strategy is desirable.
Given our restriction on what kinds of formulas can
appear in contexts (namely definite formulas), it is
possible t o view the process of proof building as one
where resource formulas get used and, if they are not,
!led, deleted. Thus, one way t o attempt a proof of
G1 8 G 2 from a D-formula D is t o first try to prove
G I , deleting non-!'ed R-formulas as they are used in
backchaining. If the search for a proof of G1 is successful, the resulting context, say D', is then used t o
prove the second goal G2. If the correct amount of resources are left t o prove G 2 , then the compound goal
G1 @ G2 will have been proved without splitting the
context artificially.
With this motivation, we can define the predicate
I{G)O, where I and 0 are D-formuhe, t o mean informally that when given input I, a proof for G can be
found that returns the resources in 0 . To malie t~llisinformal notion precise, we need the following definitions
regarding definite formulas. Notice that coinpollents
of a definite formula D are either 1 or of the form R or
!R. The ternary relation pickR(I,O, R) holds if R is a
component of I and 0 results from replacing that occurrence of R in I with 1 (this achieves deletion). The
relation also holds if !R is a component of I, a.nd I and
0 are equal (!'ed formulas are not deleted). A definite
formula 0 is a s u b t e n s o r of I, denoted by the predicate subtensor(1,O) if 0 arises from replacing zero or
more non-!'ed components of I with 1. The formula. I
is thinable, written thinable(I), if all of its colnponents
are either 1 or !'ed formulas.
Figure 3 provides a specification of the predicate
I{G)O for the propositional fragment of this logic in
which the simpler definition of resource formulas (see
(*) above) is used (no equations are needed to char-

Figure 3: Specification of an interpreter for the propositional language
acterize contexts in this specification). A fuller specification of I{G)O and the other predicates is given
using Prolog in Figure 4. In that presentation, I{G)O
is written using the syntax prove(1 ,O , G ) , @ is written as x, -o as - 0 , T as t r u e , and !G as bang((;).
(Infix declarations for x, -0, and & are missing from
Figure 4, as are Horn clauses defining the atomic formulas of the object-logic via the i s A predicate.) The
Prolog code only implements the propositional part of
this logic since Prolog has no natural representation of
object-level quantification. If XProlog [22] is used for
this specification, such quantifiers can be implemented
directly using A-abstractions. The resulting specification in XProlog would be identical to that given in
Figure 4 except that two more Horn clauses - one for
proving a universal quantifier and one for backchaining over a universal quantifier - would need t o be
a.dded.
I11 order t o state the correctness of these specifications
of I{G)O, we need the notion of the difference, I 0, of two definite formulas, whenever it is the case
that subtensor(1,O). This is defined by the following
equations:

I-Iere, of course, R denotes a resource formula.
P r o p o s i t i o n 4 Let I and 0 be contexts (definite form u l a s ) and let G be a goal formula. T h e proposition
I{G)O i s provable if a n d o n l y if ( I - 0 ) -0 G i s provable i n linear logic.

Thus, a complete procedure for proving queries from
Horn clauses can be used to prove sequents of the form
D
G in linear logic. A depth-first search procedure for Horn clauses can also provide a depth-first
search procedure for linear logic. Consider the behaviour of a Prolog interpreter attempting to prove
I{G1 @ Gz)O. First the interpreter tries to prove
I{G1)M, for some definite formula M . If this succeeds, then M { G 2 ) 0 is attempted. If this second
attempt fails, the interpreter retries I{G1)M looking for some different pattern of consumption to find
a new value for M. If such a value is found, then
M { G 2 ) 0 is re-attempted. Similarly, in attempting t o
prove I { D 4 G)O, the interpreter will first attempt
to prove D @ I { G ) B @ 0 and then check that B is
a thinable context. If this is not the case, the11 the
interpreter must retry D @ I{G)B @ 0 looking for a
new value for B.

-

Proposition 5 T h e goal formula G is provable in 1i11.ear logic if and only if the proposition 1{G)1 is provable.
As the process of constructing a proof of 1{G)1 proceeds, a Horn clause interpreter would generate goals
of the form

where T I , . . . ,Tn,S 1 , . . . , Sn are definite formulas and
n
0 is the number of -R rules encouiltered on the
path from the root. Thus, contexts act as stacks, and
corresponding elements, say T, and Si, are related by
the subtensor relation.

>

It is worth noting that, in this setting, proviilg the
goal !G from a D-formula is equivalent t o proving tmhe
goal 1 & G from that same D-formula.

4

prove('sl*
prove(I.0, true)
:- subtensor(1, 0)
prove(I.0, GI & G2) :- prove(I,O,GI),
prove (I,0,G2) .
prove(I,O, D -0 G) :- prove(D x I,B x O,G),
thinable (B) .
prove (1 ,o,
~ 2 ):- prove(1 , M , G ~,)
t rove (M,0 ,G2) .
prove(I,I, bang((;)) :- prove(I,I,~).
prove (I,0, A)
:- isA(A), pickR(I,H,R),
backchain(M,O ,A,R).
backchain(I,I,A, A).
backchain(1 ,O,A, G -0 R)

backchain(I,M,A,R) ,
prove(M,O,G).
backchain(I,O.A, R1 & R2) :- backchain(I,O,A,Rl);
backchain(I,O,A,R2).
:-

Context Management in Theorelll
Provers

Intuitionistic logic is a useful meta-logic for the specification of provability of various object.-logics. For
example, consider axiomatizing provability in propositional, intuitionistic logic (over the logical symbols
imp, and, o r , and f a l s e for object-level implica.t.ion,
conjunction, disjunction, and absurdity). A very natural axiomization of implication introduction is (ignoring the actual construction of proofs)
pv(A

thinable (1) .
thinable (bang(T) 1.
thinable (T x S) :- thinable(T) , thinableGI .

imp B) :- hyp(A) => pv(B).

where pv and hyp are the meta-level predicates denoting provability and hypothesis. Here => denotes metalevel implies and :- denotes its converse. We also

Figure 4: A Prolog implementation of the interpreter

pv(A and
pv(A imp
pv(A or
pv(A or
pv(G) opv(G) opv(G) o-

pv(G) opv(G) o-

B) o- pv(B) & pv(A).
B) o- hyp(A) -0 pv(B).
B) o- pv(A).
B) o- pv(B).
hyp(A and B) x
(hyp(A) x hyp(B) -0 pv(G)).
hyp(A or B) x ((hyp(A) -0 pv(G) k
(hyp(B) -0 pv(G))).
hyp(C imp B) x
(hyp(C imp B) -0 pv(C)) &
(hyp(B) -0 pv(G)).
hyp(f a l s e ) x t r u e .
hyp(G)
x true.

Figure 5: A Specification of An Intuitionistic Propositional Object-Logic
adopt the convention that any capital letters in a formula that are not explicitly quantified a.re assuined to
be universally quantified at the outermost scope of the
displayed formula. Operationally, this formula states
that one way t o prove A imp B is t o add hyp(A) t o the
context and attempt a proof of pv (B) . In the same setting, conjunction elimination can be expressed by the
formula

(where a comma denotes a meta-level coi~junction).
Operationally, this formula states that in order t o
prove some formula G I first check t o see if there is
a conjunction, say A and B, in the contest and, if so,
attempt a proof of G in which the context is extended
with the two hypotheses A and B. Other introduction
and elimination rules can be axiomatized similarly. Finally, the formula

is needed t o actually complete a proof. With the complete specification, it is easy t o prove that there is a
proof in the meta-logic (the logic programming world)
if and only if there is a proof in the object-logic.
This method of specifying provability does not extend
naturally t o logics that have restricted contraction
rules, such as linear logic itself, because hypotheses are
maintained in intuitionistic logic contexts and hence
can be used zero or more times. Similarly, it is not
possible to logically express the fact that in intuitionistic propositional logic, contraction is needed only for

pv(G) o- hyp((C imp D) imp B) x
((hyp(D imp B) -0 pv(C imp D)) k
(hyp(B) -0 pv(G) 1).
pv(G) o- hyp((C and D) imp B) x
(hyp(C imp (D imp B) -0 pv(G)).
pv(G) o- hyp((C or D) imp B) x
(hyp(C imp B) -0 hyp(D imp B) -0 pv(G))
pv(G) o- hyp(fa1se imp B) x pv(G).
pv(G) o- hyp(A imp B) x isatom(A) x
hyp(A) x (hyp(B) x hyp(A) -0 pv(G)).

Figure 6: A Contraction-Free Formulation of

.

>L

implication elimination and not for any other logical
connectives. If we replace the intuitionistic meta-logic
with our refinement using linear logic, however, these
~bservat~ions
about contraction in intuitionistic logic
can be stated. Figure 5 is such a specification. Here,
and in the rest of the code segments in the paper,
o- denotes the converse of - 0 .
Formulas carry the
same implicit quantifier assumption mentioned above.
In a.ddition, each quantified formula is assumed t o be
!'ed at the outermost level. Finally, the individual formulas are tied together with 8 ' s t o form a single D
formula for the proof context.

In the modified specification, a hypothesis is both
"read from" and "written into" the context during the
elimination of implications. All other elimination rules
sinlply "read from" the context; they do not "write
back." The last two formulas in Figure 5 use a 8 with
T: this allows for all unused hypotheses t o be erased.
It should be noted that this specification cannot be
used effectively with a depth-first interpreter because
if the inlplication left rule can be used once, it can
be used any number of times, thereby causing the
interpreter to loop. Fortunately for this example,
a contraction-free presentation of propositional intuitionistic logic is given in [6]. T h a t presentation can
be expressed directly in this setting by replacing the
one formula specifying implication elimination in Figure 5 with the (partial) axiomatization of object-level
atomic formulas and the five special cases of implication elimination in Figure 6. Executing this linear
logic program in depth-first mode yields a decision
procedure for propositional intuitionistic logic.

5

The Modality of !'ed Formulas

One extension t o logic programming languages that
has been studied for several years is the demopredicate [4]. The intended meaning of attempting
a query of the form demo(D, G) in context (program)
I' is simply attempting the query G in the context containing only D; that is, the main context is forgotten
during the scope of the demo-predicate. A use of a
!'ed goal has a related meaning. Consider proving the
8 G2. Given our analysis of
sequent !R1 8 R2 -!GI
proofs in Section 2, this is provable if and only if the
two sequents !R1 + G1 and !R1 8 R z --+ G2 are
provable. In other words, the use of the "of course"
operator forces G I to be proved in a context that contains only !'ed formulas. In a sense, since non-!led resources can come and go within contexts, they can be
viewed as "contingent" resources; an of-course operator on a resource in a context means that it will always
be present in the context; that is, it is a "necessary"
resource. The of-course operator attached to a goal ensures that the provability of the goal only depends on
the necessary and not the contingent resources of t,he
context. Thus, with respect t o contiilgeilt resources,
the goal !(D * G) behaves similarly to demo(D, G ) .
We present two simple examples where this modality
of !'ed formulas is illustrated. The first is a simple
data base query program displayed in Figure 7. To
make this example interesting, we have augmented the
language with the read, write, and nl (new line) input/output commands. Figure 8 presents a session using this program. This example also shows some possible limitations of linear contexts in this data base setting. For example, it does not seem possible to query
a context to find out if an entry is contingent and
not necessary (although accommodating negation-asfailure would make this possible). Also, a coininand
to retract a necessary (committed) entry call be executed without any problem (see Figure 8), but it does
not have the effect of actually deleting the entry.
The kinds of manipulations demonstrated here can be
used t o correct the notion of state enca.psulation and
updating that was used in [15].
Our second example of the of-course modality is a simple natural language parsing example. In [23, 241 an
intuitionistic context was used to manage the introduction and scoping of gaps. This approach, although
modeling various aspects of gapping correctly, was unsatisfactory for at least two reasons. First, the phrase
"whom Bob married Ann" would parse incorrectly a.s
a relative clause. The restriction that a gap, once introduced, must be used is not ea.sy to enforce using

db o- write('Command: ') x read(Command) x
do (Command) .
db o- write('Try again.') x nl x db.
do (enter(Entry1)
o- entry (Entry) -0 db.
do (commit(Entry)) o- bang(entry(Entry)) -0 db.
do(retract(Entry)) o- entry(Entry1 x db.
do (upd(Old, New)) o- entry (Old) x
(entry(New) -0 db).
do(check(Q)) o- (entry(9) x true x write(@ x
write(' is an entry.') x nl) & db.
do(necessary (4)) o(bang(entry (9)) x true x vrite(Q) x
write(' is a necessary entry') x nl) & db.
do(quit) o- true.

Figure 7: A Simple Data Base Query Program

Command: enter(enroll(jane,csl)).
Command: check(enroll(jane,X) .
enroll(jane, csi) is an entry.
Command: upd(enroll(jane,csl),
enroll (jane ,cs2) )
Command: check(enroll(jane,X)).
enroll(jane ,cs2) is an entry.
Command: commit (student (jane)) .
Command: enter(student(b0b)).
Command: necessary(student(X)).
student(jane) is a necessary entry
Command: retract (student (jane)) .
Command: necessary (student (X) ) .
student(jane) is a necessary entry
Command: necessary(student(bob)).
again.
quit

.

Figure 8: A Session Using the Data Base Query Progra"

sent(Pl,P2) o- bang(np(P1 ,PO)) x vp(PO,P2).
vp(Pi,P2)
o- tv(P1,P0) x np(PO,P2).
vp(P1 ,P2) o- stv(P1 ,PO) x sbar(PO,P2).
sbar( [that IPl] ,P2) o- sent (PI ,P2).
np(P1 ,P2) o- pn(P1 ,Pa)
rel([vhomlX],Y) o- all z\(np(z,z)) -0 sent(X,Y).
pn(CmarylL1 ,L) 0- 1.
pn([boblL],L) o- 1.
pn(CannlL1,L) o- 1.
tv([loveslLI ,L) o- 1.
tv( CmarriedlLI ,L) o- 1.
stv([believes 1 L] ,L) o- 1.

.

Figure 9: A simple parser for gaps in English
an intuitionistic context. Second, various restrictions
on occurrences of gaps are not explained using such
contexts. For example, gaps introduced by "whom"
can occur in object but not nominal positions. Thus
the phrase "whom Ann believes that Bob married"
is correct (the gap is the object of "married") while
"whom Ann believes that married Bob" is incorrect
(the gap is the subject of "married"). This "modal"
distinction between these two kinds of noun phrases is
not addressed naturally using intuitionistic logic.
The small logic program in Figure 9 illustrates how
linear contexts can be used to solve these problems.
Here, a definite clause grammar (DCG) [28] style
presentation of a parser is used. Each category of
the grammar, such as sent for sentence, vp for verb
phrase, sbar for complement clauses, etc., is given
two additional arguments, denoting a difference list,
of words. T h e rule for relative clauses (rel) introduces a gap, namely the formula all z\(np(z,z)).
This formula represents a contingent resource: a gap
of zero length. I t can be used t o prove the noun phra.se
mentioned in the vp definite formula but not the one
in the sent definite formula: tlie latter occurrence of
np is protected by a !. Thus the two goals

.

rel([whom,ann ,believes,that,bob,married]
re1 ( [whom, bob, married] [I )

, [I )

are provable but the two goals
rel([whom,ann,believes, that ,married,bobl , [I )
re1 ( [whom, bob, married, ann] , [I )

era1 similar types of "island constraints" occur in natural language parsing problems [27]. The use of !'ed
formulas may aid in handling these constraints as well.

6

Related Work

There are many ways in which linear logic can be fruitfully exploited t o address aspects of logic programming. Girard modeled the difference between the classical, "external" logic of Horn clauses and the "internal" logic of Prolog that arises from the use of depthfirst search using a non-commutative linear logic [ll].
Cerrito appplied classical linear logic t o the problem
of formalizing finite failure for certain kinds of Horn
clause programs where negations are permitted in the
body of clauses [5].
Linear logic has been used t o extend the basic design of logic programming languages in at least two
pa.pers other than this one. Andreoli and Pareschi extended IIorn clauses so that programs in the resulting
language make use of the multiple conclusion nature
of full linea,r logic [Z]. In that extension, a form of
context on the right of a sequent arrow is possible.
They present several examples and argue that various
aspects of object-oriented programming can be supported naturally within such contexts. Interestingly,
their extension is rather different than ours: the intersection of the classes of program formulas in the two
systems is just the set of Horn clauses. Harland and
Pym a.lso proposed In a fragment of linear logic as a
logic programming language [13]. As was done here,
the fragment is chosen so that uniform proofs remain
complete. Since having !'s in succedents stops several
inference rule permutations from holding, their proposal disallows such succedents. Thus, goal formulas
are weaker than those presented here, but contexts are
richer. The loss of !'ed goals, however, means that the
examples in Section 5 cannot be coded directly.
In the area of natural language parsing, Lambek
[16, 171 used a logic that can be identified with a noncommutative variant of linear logic for inferring the
synta.ctic categories of phrases. Recently, Pereira handled gaps using a (commutative) linear logic-like context mechanism [26]. Neither of these approaches use
Yi or the "of course" operator and, hence, the apparent modal distinction between noun phrase as subject
or object cannot be captured directly in them.

are not. As this parser rules out subject e ~ t r a . ~ t i o n , There ha.ve been several examples in print of the need
to refine the notion of intuitionistic context within
sentences that require such extractions must be hanlogic programming. In this abstract, we proposed a
dled with additional specialized grammer rules. Sev-

refinement using a fragment of linear logic. We argued
that this fragment is a sensible logic programming language and presented an interpreter for it. Finally, we
outlined how those problems with intuitionistic contexts can be addressed directly using the refillemeats
available from linear logic.
A prototype interpreter, written in SML, of the firstorder logic programming language described here is
available from the first author.
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